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Thinking about Peace in Ancient India
JOHANNES BRONKHORST
Aśoka
Indian history begins, in a certain way, in the third century BCE with the inscrip-
tions of Aśoka.1 These inscriptions are among the earliest surviving written 
testimony from the subcontinent. Their contents are surprising, to say the 
least. They are messages for his subjects from Emperor Aśoka, who calls him-
self “the beloved of the gods.” And they tell us a lot about the emperor him-
self, especially about his religious and generally moral attitudes. We know from 
these inscriptions that Aśoka turned to Buddhism at some point in his life, and 
that he considered himself a lay Buddhist. Not unrelated, but of more immedi-
ate interest for our topic, are the regrets that Aśoka expresses about the vio-
lence he had perpetrated during the conquest of a region in eastern India, 
Kalin ̇ga. We find this in the so‐called thirteenth Major Rock Edict, extracts of 
which I present here in the somewhat free rendering of Romila Thapar:
When he had been consecrated eight years the Beloved of the Gods, the king 
Piyadassi, conquered Kaliṅga. A hundred and fifty thousand people were deported, 
a hundred thousand were killed and many times that number perished. … 











On  conquering Kalin ̇ga the Beloved of the Gods felt remorse, for, when an inde-
pendent country is conquered the slaughter, death, and deportation of the people 
is extremely grievous to the Beloved of the Gods, and weighs heavily on his mind. 
What is even more deplorable to the Beloved of the Gods, is that those who dwell 
there, whether brahmans, śraman ̣as, or those of other sects, or householders who 
show obedience to their superiors, obedience to mother and father, obedience to 
their teachers and behave well and devotedly towards their friends, acquaintances, 
colleagues, relatives, slaves, and servants—all suffer violence, murder, and separa-
tion from their loved ones. Even those who are fortunate to have escaped, and 
whose love is undiminished [by the brutalizing effect of war], suffer from the 
misfortunes of their friends, acquaintances, colleagues, and relatives. This partici-
pation of all men in suffering, weighs heavily on the mind of the Beloved of the 
Gods. … Today if a hundredth or a thousandth part of those people who were 
killed or died or were deported when Kalin ̇ga was annexed were to suffer similarly, 
it would weigh heavily on the mind of the Beloved of the Gods.2
Aśoka tries to remedy the situation by promoting the victory of Dharma, which 
approximately translates “righteous rule, correct behavior.” It covers, for 
Aśoka, a variety of virtues, including generosity, medical care for humans and 
animals, religious tolerance, and much else. Virtually all his Rock Edicts deal 
with the propagation of Dharma within and beyond his empire. The thirteenth 
Major Rock Edict continues:
The Beloved of the Gods considers victory by Dharma to be the foremost victory. 
And moreover the Beloved of the Gods has gained this victory on all his frontiers to 
a distance of six hundred yojanas [i.e. about 1500 miles], where reigns the Greek king 
named Antiochus, and beyond the realm of that Antiochus in the lands of the four 
kings named Ptolemy, Antigonus, Magas, and Alexander; and in the south over the 
Col ̣as and Pāṇḍyas as far as Ceylon. Likewise here in the imperial territories among the 
Greeks and the Kambojas, Nābhakas and Nābhapanktis, Bhojas and Pitinikas, Andhras 
and Pārindas, everywhere the people follow the Beloved of the Gods’ instructions in 
Dharma. Even where the envoys of the Beloved of the Gods have not gone, people 
hear of his conduct according to the Dharma, his precepts and his instruction in 
Dharma, and they follow Dharma and will continue to follow it.3
We should not conclude from this that Aśoka had renounced all use of vio-
lence. Indeed, as Hans Bakker points out, “he is not slow to add that those 
subjugated by him ‘should be told of the power (to punish them) which 
Devānāṃpriya [i.e. Aśoka, JB] (possesses) in spite of (his) repentance, in order 
that they may be ashamed (of their crimes) and may not be killed’.”4
Aśoka is no doubt a unique and perhaps also extreme case in the ancient 
world. His empire stands at the beginning of the political history of classical 
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India. Its memory bequeathed to subsequent rulers and thinkers an ambiguous 
message.5 This will be clear from the following passage, which I quote from 
Hartmut Scharfe’s book The State in Indian Tradition:
Even though Indians admired heroes and glorious conquests throughout their his-
tory, the ideal kingdom of the epic and classical texts was seen as a state of permanent 
peace. The notion of a single state for the whole “world,” (i.e. the Indian subconti-
nent) could satisfy from the time of the Brāhman ̣a‐texts on the thirst for ultimate 
glory and, at the same time, put an end to the perpetual wars between a multitude of 
competing dynasties. No Hindu ruler ever achieved that goal, and the attempts to 
reach it led to numerous and bloody conflicts. Each king is potentially and ideally a 
vijigīṣu “desirous to conquer [the world]” and aspires to be a sār va-bhauma  “[king] 
ruling the whole world” or a cakravar tin.6
The ultimate aim of permanent and universal peace led in practice to ceaseless 
and relentless war.
Brahmanism
It makes sense to distinguish two major currents in the post‐Mauryan intel-
lectual history of India: the Brahmins and the Buddhists. The thinkers of these 
two currents dealt quite differently with the inherited ideal of permanent and 
universal peace.
The Brahmanical thinkers, to begin with, were pragmatic in their approach. 
This is clear from the Brahmanical texts that deal, as a whole or in part, with 
statecraft. The one called Ar thaśāstra  (“Treatise on Statecraft”) is no doubt 
the oldest surviving Brahmanical text that exclusively deals with such issues. 
Let me say a few words about it.
Brahmanical tradition ascribes the authorship of the Ar thaśāstra  to a person 
variously called Cāṇakya and Kauṭalya/Kauṭilya. Still according to Brahmanical 
tradition, this person was a Brahmin who advised King Candragupta, Aśoka’s 
grandfather and the founder of the Mauryan empire, which Aśoka inherited 
and expanded. This Brahmin, moreover, was such a cunning politician that 
without him Candragupta would not have succeeded in creating his empire.7
The identification of the two persons—the minister of Candragupta and the 
author of the Ar thaśāstra—is no doubt apocryphal.8 The fact that no writing 
was used in India at the time of Candragupta Maurya is one reason to think 
so.9 Another is the fact that the Ar thaśāstra  presupposes a kingdom that can be 
surrounded by more powerful rivals, whereas the empire of Candragupta and 











his successors could not be encircled.10 Then there is the obvious advantage 
which more recent Brahmins could derive from the claim that the Mauryan 
empire—which had not been sympathetic to them—had really been created by 
a Brahmin, using the methods which those more recent Brahmins promoted 
among the rulers that were their contemporaries.11
The Ar thaśāstra  (13.4.55–63) distinguishes four possible ways of con-
quering the world.12 It does not waste words on this final goal. Most of the 
text deals with concerns—such as ruling a state and taking maximum advan-
tage from the relative strengths and weaknesses of neighboring kings—that 
come up when conquering the world is still a distant dream. It does so mat-
ter‐of‐factly, with few theoretical digressions or justifications. One may 
assume that the final goal of permanent and universal peace is to be consid-
ered a hidden justification for the sometimes doubtful recommendations 
that the text contains, but if so, the text does not say so. One has the feeling 
that the Brahmins who composed the Ar thaśāstra  were less interested in 
dreams than in securing and safeguarding their own position at and around 
the royal courts.
This does not mean that the Ar thaśāstra  is not interested in ordinary peace, 
the kind of peace that may reign between neighboring kingdoms or within a 
kingdom. However, this kind of peace is not always an aim in itself. Frequently, 
it is, as so many other things in this text, a means to an end; that is, to the 
intermediate end of maintaining power and, of course, of maintaining the 
social order in which Brahmins occupy a privileged position. The idea, for 
example, that kings should look after the well‐being of their subjects is not 
unknown to the text. Typically, it does not present this as a duty of the king, 
but as a topic that secret agents in disguise should discuss in public places in 
order to restrain the common people and to find out who among them might 
feel critical of the present king (1.13.1–14).13 And peace with a neighboring 
king is but a temporary ploy, to be abandoned once one has the means to over-
throw or conquer him. Peace is also useful for creating confidence in one’s 
neighbor, whose power can then be undermined by secret manipulations and 
occult means (7.1).14
Another classical Brahmanical text—the so‐called Laws of Manu (Manusmr ̣ti 
or Mānava Dharmaśāstra)—dedicates some of its chapters to matters of state. 
Like the Ar thaśāstra , it unabashedly describes the task of kings as acquiring 
with military force what they have not yet acquired, to preserve with vigilance 
what they have acquired, to augment what they have preserved through profit-
able investments, and to distribute through gifts what has been augmented in 
this manner (7.101). The recipients of the gifts, to be sure, are the Brahmins. 
The Laws of Manu is not in favor of war, but the reason is not the promotion 
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of peace as such, but rather the consideration that war brings risks that may be 
avoided by trying out other means first (7.198–200):
He [the king] should strive to triumph over his enemies through conciliation, gifts, 
and fomenting dissension, employed collectively or separately, but never through war. 
Victory and defeat in battle are uncertain for the two combatants; he should, there-
fore, avoid war. When the aforementioned three strategies fail, then let him, always on 
guard, pursue war in such a manner that he will triumph over his enemies.15
War remains an honorable occupation, as the following verse shows (7.89):
When kings fight each other in battles with all their strength, seeking to kill each other 
and refusing to turn back, they go to heaven.
The Pañcatantra , to give one more example, though presenting its political 
advice in charming fables, is no more peace‐minded than the two preceding 
works. The title of its first book—“On causing dissension among allies” in 
Olivelle’s translation—reveals its cynical attitude, while book III—“On war 
and peace”—explains with the help of stories how wit can be used to attain 
one’s goals without resorting to war.16 No idealism here, only calculation.
The Brahmanical political tradition, then, was not actively in search of 
peace. Quite on the contrary, it impressed upon rulers that the expansion of 
their realms was part of their duty and that war in the service of that aim was 
justified, even obligatory. This is not just the attitude of books that are, 
wholly or in part, political manuals, such as the Ar thaśāstra , the Laws of 
Manu  and the Pañcatantra  just considered. It also finds expression in such 
texts as the Bhagavadgītā, arguably the most popular book of Hinduism until 
today. The Bhagavadgītā contains the teaching imparted by God to the war-
rior Arjuna, just before a battle in which Arjuna is going to destroy many 
friends and family members. Arjuna’s scruples are presented in detail, but 
they are discarded with the argument that it is a warrior’s duty to fight. 
Political peace in the sense of avoidance of war is not part of the ideology of 
this text, as it is not part of most other texts belonging to the Brahmanical 
tradition.17
Brahmanical political thought succeeded in exerting ever‐greater influence 
on the rulers of the numerous kingdoms that the South Asian subcontinent has 
known. Countless panegyrics that survive in inscriptions—especially from the 
time of the Guptas onward, that is, from about the fourth century CE—praise 
rulers for the conquests they have made, and for the harm they have been able 
to inflict upon their neighbors and competitors.18 These inscriptions are 
depressing reading and could not be more different in their general tone from 











the inscriptions of Aśoka with which we began. The victory of Brahmanism in 
the realm of religious, social, and political ideas expressed itself in what might 
be called a celebration of war, both in reality and in rhetorical contexts.
Still, we should not conclude from what precedes that Brahmins did not 
want to live in peace. Other things being equal, we must assume that everyone, 
with the possible exception of born and committed warriors, wishes to live in 
peace. But Brahmins wanted peace in conditions that were favorable to them. 
This meant in practice that often they encouraged warfare—not least because, 
in the general political situation of their day, kings who were ready to engage 
in war were more likely to stay in power than those who were not. Brahmanism’s 
success was in part due to the fact that it did not hesitate to promote war. By 
doing so, it betted on the right horse, so to say. Conversely, this political ideol-
ogy suited ambitious kings, and the kings who adopted this ideology may, on 
the whole, have had less inner resistance to war and therefore greater chances 
of staying in charge or even extending their power.
The pragmatic attitude of the Brahmanical texts with regard to the realities 
of war and peace has much to do with the fact that Brahmanism, as it managed 
to impose itself during the centuries following the collapse of the Mauryan 
empire, was primarily a vision of society. Brahmanism was no religion that 
attempted to make religious converts. Indeed, if we look upon the ideas found 
in the Vedic corpus of texts as being the religious doctrines of Brahmanism, we 
must conclude that Brahmanism kept its doctrines secret: large portions of the 
population had no right whatsoever to hear (or read) the Veda. The Brahmins 
themselves were barely interested in those doctrines. Brahmanism, I repeat, 
was primarily a vision of a highly stratified society, in which Brahmins occupied 
the highest position and kings were there to create and expand kingdoms. 
Brahmanism succeeded over time in imposing itself on large parts of the South 
Asian subcontinent and beyond. Not least among the reasons of its success was 
its capability to help rulers by giving them the pragmatic advice they needed.
What about the ahim ̣sā (“nonviolence”) for which India has become so 
famous? The answer is given in the following passage, which I borrow from an 
article by Jos Gommans:
The ultimate aim for both Brahmins and kings was not earthly power but eternal 
salvation; the way thither was not conquering the world but renouncing it. His pur-
suit also involved the well‐known Indian ideal of ahim ̣sā or non‐injury to life. As it 
was only the ascetic who could really live up to it, world‐renouncement and ahim ̣sā 
had to be internalized by those whose dharmic role could not escape the evil conse-
quences of worldly action. As such, this second‐best option was most fitting for kings 
and warriors wielding earthly power. Hence, their him ̣sā (violence, JB) had to be 
detached, without self‐interest; ahim ̣sā only serving to calm their inner world. This 










 THINKING ABOUT PEACE IN ANCIENT INDIA 73
also explains why even martial sects of ascetic warriors saw no problem at all in sub-
scribing to the vow of ahim ̣sā … In any case, it is clear that ahim ̣sā was not meant to 
establish peace in the public realm as had been the prime objective of the European 
peace movements.19
Buddhism
Buddhist thinkers were not quite as pragmatic as their Brahmanical confrères. 
This is hardly surprising. Buddhism did not start out as a vision of society, even 
less as a model to be followed in ruling a state. It taught a path to escape from 
rebirth, and following this path implied leaving society and surviving hence-
forth by begging. The nature of the society left behind was of little concern to 
the early followers of the Buddha.20
This initial situation did not last long. Buddhism soon became the victim of 
its own success. The community of monks and nuns organized itself, and mon-
asteries were created. Questions regarding the interaction between the Buddhist 
community and society at large became inevitable, all the more so since the 
core members of the Buddhist community, the monks and nuns, had few or no 
worldly possessions. In order to build monasteries and places of worship, a 
steady stream of gifts from donors was required. The Buddhists could not for-
ever go on hiding their heads in the sand as far as questions of society and its 
political organization were concerned. But the challenge they were confronted 
with was too great to deal with.
Consider first an early text, part of the Buddhist canon, that deals with the 
organization of society and explains how it came to be as it is. This text, the 
Aggañña Sutta , criticizes the Brahmanical vision of society and rejects the notion 
according to which Brahmins are fundamentally different from all other mem-
bers of society. Brahmins had justified their claim to superiority with the help of 
a myth, which recounts that Brahmins, unlike all other human beings, were born 
from the mouth of the Creator God. The Aggañña Sutta  does not accept this 
and presents a creation story of its own. In this alternative story, differences 
between people only came about as a result of different behavior in some unspec-
ified past. Brahmins, for example, are the descendants of people who meditated 
or compiled books; the text hastens to add that Brahmins have a common ances-
try with all other classes of society. The kingly class came about when people 
chose one from among themselves to impose order on society. Once again the 
text emphasizes the common origin of the king with the other classes.21
The Aggañña Sutta , while reacting to Brahmanical ideas, adopts some of 
them. It criticizes the fundamental difference between the four classes of 











society taught by the Brahmins, yet accepts this division of society as real. 
It also accepts without discussion that kings behave the way kings do. In the 
words of the Aggañña Sutta , a king is a being who, appointed by the rest of 
the population, “would show anger where anger was due, censure those who 
deserved it, and banish those who deserved banishment.”22
Yet this is where the shoe pinches. Buddhism teaches a path that leads to 
liberation. This path is open to all human beings, not just Brahmins or some 
other group. Buddhism is therefore bound to encourage behavior that, in the 
long or short run, leads to that goal. The strong‐arm tactics that worldly rulers 
use (and may be compelled to use) do not lead in that direction. In fact, they 
do the opposite. The Brahmins could maintain that a certain class of people, 
the warriors, were born with the obligation to use violence in appropriate cir-
cumstances. They could point out that a warrior who did not use violence in 
such circumstances might expect to be punished for this omission, in this or in 
a next life. For Buddhists this was harder to maintain. They recognized no 
separate class of warriors, fundamentally different from other human beings, 
with different obligations and different fates. For Buddhists there was no fun-
damental difference between a monk and a warrior. If violence was wrong for 
the one, it was wrong for the other.
This is the conundrum in which Buddhist theoreticians of political power 
found themselves. Was there a right way of ruling a country, without violence? 
In answering this question, the memory of the Mauryan empire, and especially 
of its emperor Aśoka, appears to have made itself felt. Aśoka, as we have seen, 
talked about the victory of Dharma, that is, of “righteous rule, correct behav-
ior.” The notion of Dharma in connection with political power had great 
appeal to the Buddhists. They thought and spoke about a Dharma‐king, who 
conquered the world in an unobjectionable manner. The Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda 
Sutta , another canonical text, describes what happened to one such righteous 
king to whom one day a Wheel appeared:23
Then, rising from his seat, covering one shoulder with his robe, the king took a gold 
vessel in his left hand, sprinkled the Wheel with his right hand, and said: “May the 
noble Wheel‐Treasure turn, may the noble Wheel‐Treasure conquer!” The Wheel 
turned to the east, and the king followed it with his fourfold army. And in whatever 
country the Wheel stopped, the king took up residence with his fourfold army. And 
those who opposed him in the eastern region came and said: “Come, Your Majesty, 
welcome! We are yours, Your Majesty. Rule us, Your Majesty.” And the king said: “Do 
not take life. Do not take what is not given. Do not commit sexual misconduct. Do 
not tell lies. Do not drink strong drink. Be moderate in eating.” And those who had 
opposed him in the eastern region became his subjects.
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Then the Wheel turned south, west, and north… (as before). Then the Wheel‐
Treasure, having conquered the lands from sea to sea, returned to the royal capital 
and stopped before the king’s palace.24
We do not know how many Buddhist monarchs waited in vain for a Wheel‐
Treasure to appear and help them in the task of conquering the world. 
Without a Wheel‐Treasure the task became much harder, and would inevita-
bly breach the rules that the king was supposed to promulgate, especially the 
ones about not taking life and not taking what is not given. In spite of these 
drawbacks, there were always volunteers to carry out the job, even without 
Wheel‐Treasure. The question is, what advice could their Buddhist counse-
lors give them?
The answer is, very little. We possess some works whose stated aim is to give 
advice to (sometimes identifiable) kings. One of these is a letter sent to the 
young King Kaniṣka by the Buddhist scholar Mātṛcet ̣a in the second century 
CE. It is not clear to which Kaniṣka the letter was addressed (several kings bore 
that name), nor indeed whether it was really sent to a king of that name.25 
However, the most famous Kaniṣka (Kaniṣka I) was a king of the Kuṣāṇa 
dynasty, about whom the Indian historian Romila Thapar writes: “The Kushana 
dynasty was in the ascendant in central Asia under Kanishka, whose relation-
ship to the earlier kings has been confirmed by the recent discovery of an 
inscription in Afghanistan. In this he claims that he conquered hindo/India, 
i.e. the better‐known north‐west of India, and proclaimed his conquest in all 
the cities as far as Champa (in the middle Ganges Plain).”26 Perhaps the most 
striking feature of Mātṛceṭa’s letter, addressed as it is to the successor, descend-
ant, and namesake of a king known for his conquests (if not to that king him-
self), is its emphasis on saving the life of animals. Nothing at all is said about 
the killing of humans.27
Nāgārjuna was more or less a contemporary of Mātṛceṭa.28 His Precious 
Garland contains advice for kings. Some of the passages involved show that 
Nāgārjuna’s political ideas were still very close to those that we found in the 
canonical texts studied above. Consider the following verse: “Through proper 
honoring of stūpas, honorable beings, Superiors, and the elderly, you will 
become a Universal Monarch, your glorious hands and feet marked with [a 
design of] wheels.”29 A Universal Monarch is the same as the Dharma‐king 
whom we met earlier. Like the Dharma‐king, the Universal Monarch is associ-
ated with wheels, with the difference that this time wheels appear as marks in 
his hands. Universal kingdom, here as well as there, is presented as the out-
come of virtue. Violent conquest, the verse suggests, can be avoided.











Other passages from the Precious Garland are no more practical, even though 
the pious and virtuous intentions of its author cannot be doubted. No one would 
be averse to living in a country ruled by Nāgārjuna’s ideal king. Whether such a 
king would remain in charge for long is a different question. It seems that even 
Nāgārjuna himself had some doubts, for he ends his political advice with the fol-
lowing verse: “However, if from the unrighteousness of the world it is difficult to 
rule religiously, then it is right for you to become a monastic for the sake of prac-
tice and grandeur.”30 In other words, trying to be a good and virtuous king may 
turn out to be impossible. In that case the Buddhists have no further advice to 
offer, except that it is time to turn one’s back to the world and become a monk.
The Letter to King Gautamīputra , attributed to the same Nāgārjuna, is even 
less practical in its advice than the Precious Garland, and even more insistent 
that a king really finds himself in the wrong place: “[In choosing] between the 
one who conquers [attachment to] the ever unsteady and momentary objects 
of the six sense‐organs and the one who conquers the enemy’s army in battle, 
the wise know the first to be a far greater hero.”31 The advice it gives is, as the 
text itself admits, more suitable to monks than to kings: “It is difficult even for 
a monk in isolation to follow the counsel which has been given to you; [yet] 
make this life meaningful through cultivating the quality of the essence of any 
of these practices.”32
It is conceivable, though not certain, that Mātṛceṭa and Nāgārjuna had read 
Aśvaghoṣa’s Life of the Buddha  (Buddhacarita).33 Aśvaghos ̣a puts the following 
assessment of kingship in the mouth of the future Buddha after he has left 
home but before he has reached enlightenment:
In what way could it be right for a wise man to take sovereignty on himself? It is the 
abode of delusion in which are to be found fearfulness, the intoxication of pride, 
weariness and loss of Dharma by the mishandling of others. For kingship is at the 
same time full of delights and the vehicle of calamity, like a golden palace all on fire, 
like dainty food mixed with poison, or like a lotus‐pond infected with crocodiles. … 
For it is better to eat herbs in the forest, embracing the highest contentment as if one 
were concealing a jewel, than to live with the dangers to which sovereignty is exposed, 
as if with loathsome black snakes.34
We may assume that Aśvaghoṣa, one of the first Buddhist authors to compose 
works in Sanskrit, addressed a courtly audience, as did Mātr ̣ceṭa and Nāgārjuna. 
The topic he is dealing with in his poem allows him to be even more outspoken 
than the other two, and he does not mince his words.
To conclude this discussion I will cite one more Buddhist text, Vasubandhu’s 
Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya, which dates from the fourth or fifth century CE. This text 
mentions kings, judges (daṇḍanetr)̣, and ministers (vyāvahārika) as self‐ evidently 
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(ar thataḥ) belonging to the group of indisciplined people along with fishermen, 
hunters, bandits, executioners, jailors, and others.35 No comments are called for.
Indian Buddhism, then, did not develop much in terms of thought about 
political peace, not at least during the period under discussion. And yet the 
Buddhists, including the Buddhist thinkers who developed so much acuity in 
other areas of thought, had to live in the real world in which political peace was 
of the greatest importance to them. How do we explain their lack of imagina-
tion in this crucial realm?
The answer presents itself, I believe, if we look at some more recent develop-
ments in South Asia and project our findings back into the period under con-
sideration. Recall, to begin with, that there was in India a joint presence of 
Brahmins and Buddhists for many centuries. These two competed with each 
other in several areas.36 The history of Indian philosophy during the first mil-
lennium CE, for example, can be thought of as the history of a long debate 
between Brahmanical and Buddhist thinkers. The competition between the 
two was not confined to philosophy. They competed for royal favors in a vari-
ety of ways and areas. An enumeration is not necessary at this point. There 
were, however, some areas in which the two did not compete, which the 
Buddhists abandoned to the Brahmins, and which they had apparently aban-
doned from an early date onward. An example is the field which combines 
astrology, astronomy, and mathematics, but which is jointly thought of as one 
single field in the Indian tradition. This is a field in which a succession of 
authors made some important contributions. These authors were often 
Brahmins, sometimes Jainas, but never Buddhists.37 The explanation appears to 
lie in the circumstance that Buddhists refused to be associated with anything 
that had the remotest connection with predicting the future, including astrol-
ogy. And indeed, the people who, according to an ancient legend, predicted 
the future of the Buddha soon after he was born, were Brahmins. The Buddhists, 
it appears, were ready to have their future predicted, at least in certain circum-
stances; they were not ready to do the predicting themselves. As a result, they 
cut themselves out of the market of all future developments in the area of 
astronomy and mathematics.
Surprising as it may seem, it appears that the Buddhists also left matters relat-
ing to statecraft to Brahmins. This is most clearly visible in certain Southeast 
Asian countries which, though Buddhist, kept Brahmins at the court to advise 
the king. Thailand does so until today. In Ceylon, the Buddhist kings voluntarily 
took advice about governing from Brahmanical texts, including the ones we have 
considered, the Arthaśāstra  and the Laws of Manu.38 Here and elsewhere the 
Brahmins presented themselves as specialists, with sophisticated manuals at their 
disposal and useful advice for the practicalities of governance. The Buddhists had 











no such tradition and, as we have seen, had major difficulties creating one. In this 
area, it appears, the Buddhists did not enter the competition. They left this area 
to the Brahmins, conceding that the latter were the specialists in this domain.
This situation did not last indefinitely. The later history of Buddhism in 
India shows that a variety of modifications permitted this religion to enter 
into competition with the Brahmins after all, even in realms that directly 
concerned the state. The difficulty, as we have seen, was that Buddhism 
found it difficult to present a picture of and a justification for a society in 
which there was place for real kings and realistic policy.39 Worse, Buddhism 
did not have much place for positions people might occupy in society out-
side the monastery. It concentrated on encouraging people to become 
monks and nuns. Failing this, it encouraged them to become lay followers—
upāsaka s or upāsikās—but the obligations it imposed upon them, and the 
further vows that these lay followers were expected to make, put them in a 
category quite distinct from the ordinary citizen and excluded them from 
many occupations.40 For others, most notably those involved in ruling the 
country, Buddhism had but little advice. Those others should somehow fit 
into the dominant vision of society, that of the Brahmins. As long as 
Buddhism had nothing of its own on offer, it could not but accept that 
vision, no doubt with regrets. The pressure to come up with something 
more satisfactory must have been great. It led to developments, which we 
will now briefly consider.
Let us first look at the so‐called Jātakas. These are stories that tell what the 
most recent Buddha had gone through and done in earlier lives. These deeds 
had contributed to his ultimate victory, that of becoming a Buddha. 
However, the most recent Buddha is not the only Buddha there has been, or 
will be. Already in canonical times, Buddhists had come to believe that there 
had been Buddhas before the most recent one, and that there will be others 
in the future. Obviously, the highest aim these Buddhists could aspire to was 
that of becoming a Buddha themselves. This aim, they thought, was to be 
preferred to the simpler and more self‐centered one of becoming an enlight-
ened Arhat (liberated Buddhist saint). Some of these Buddhists actually 
made a resolve to become a Buddha. This resolve is known by the name 
bodhicitta .41 Those who have generated it are henceforth Bodhisattvas, 
future Buddhas. These new Bodhisattvas drew inspiration from the Jātakas 
and tried to imitate the deeds there recounted to the extent possible.42 This 
in its turn had interesting consequences; for example, a serious and commit-
ted Buddhist did not have to be a monk, he might stay in society and play a 
role in it, just as the most recent Buddha had occupied various positions in 
society in earlier lives.43
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This last point is illustrated in an early text belonging to the Mahāyāna 
branch of Buddhism, The Inquir y of Ugra  (Ugraparipr ̣cchā). Half of this text 
gives advice to householder Bodhisattvas, including the following:
The householder Bodhisattva seeks wealth according to the Dharma; he does not seek it 
according to what is non‐Dharmic. He seeks it fairly, not unfairly. He pursues right liveli-
hood, not wrong livelihood. … not desiring happiness for himself, he causes all beings to 
attain happiness. Unmoved by profit or loss, fame or infamy, praise or blame, happiness 
or suffering, he transcends worldly things. He does not become arrogant because of 
amassing profit and wealth, nor is he discouraged by the absence of profit, fame, or 
praise. … With respect to his undertakings, he is firm in his sense of obligation.44
Furthermore:
The householder Bodhisattva who lives at home, by being free of attachment and 
aversion, should attain equanimity with respect to the eight worldly things. If he suc-
ceeds in obtaining wealth, or a wife, or children, or valuables, or produce, he should 
not become proud or overjoyed. And if he fails to obtain all these things, he should 
not be downcast or distressed.45
Note that the householder Bodhisattva depicted in this text passes his time seek-
ing wealth. It is true that there are limits to the methods he can use in doing so, 
but as long as he observes these, he can participate in economic life. He can also 
marry and have children, that is to say, participate in ordinary social life.
Another Mahāyāna text that especially addresses lay people is the Sūtra  on 
Upāsaka Precepts (Upāsakaśīla  Sūtra). This text admonishes the lay Bodhisattva 
to take a number of vows, some of which concern future lives. The following 
are of special interest in the present context:
I vow that wherever I am reborn, I shall not take rebirth as a woman, as one without 
sexual organs, or with both [male and female] sexual organs, or as a slave. … [I vow] 
not to be born in a bad country or borderland but to be born into a noble family with 
outstanding physical appearance and great wealth.46
Once again we hit upon the theme of wealth, this time inherited wealth. Clearly, 
there is nothing wrong with wealth according to the author of this passage. Quite 
on the contrary, wealth may accrue to a person because he has taken a Bodhisattva 
vow in an earlier existence.47 But acquired wealth also befits a lay Bodhisattva:
The Bodhisattva has to perfect eight dharmas to benefit himself and others. What are 
they? [They are:] (1) a long life, (2) superior appearance, (3) great physical strength, 
(4) noble birth, (5) much wealth, (6) being a male, (7) eloquence, and (8) fearlessness 
when facing great assemblies of people.48











And how does one perfect these dharmas?
The Bodhisattva mahāsattva  has compassion and does not kill for immeasurable 
lives; for this reason he obtains a long life. In measureless lives he constantly gives 
away clothing and lamps, and for this reason he enjoys a superior appearance. In 
measureless lives he always destroys arrogance, and for this reason he is born in a 
noble family. In measureless lives he always gives food to others, and for this reason 
he obtains great physical strength. In measureless lives he always takes delight in 
speaking the Dharma, and for this reason he obtains great wealth. In measureless 
lives he loathes the female body and for this reason he is born as a man. In measure-
less lives he keeps precepts sincerely, and for this reason he is eloquent. In measure-
less lives he makes offerings to the Three Treasures, and so he is fearless in the 
assembly.49
Wealth, and all the other advantages that certain people have with respect to 
others, are here presented as a virtue, or rather as the outcome of virtue in 
earlier existences.
Let me emphasize the importance of the development here sketched. 
Buddhism had from the beginning presented itself as a path leading to the end 
of suffering and rebirth. This path consisted in saying farewell to the world and 
dedicating oneself to the spiritual practices taught by the Buddha. Monks and 
nuns actually did so (or were supposed to do so), upāsakas and upāsikās did so 
to a considerable degree. Those who did not do so and remained in the world 
had an ill‐defined position in the Buddhist scheme of things. They might feel 
sympathetic toward the Buddhist teaching and community, but it was not clear 
whether and to what extent they could be thought of as partaking in the 
Buddhist path.
Non‐monastic Buddhists could not forever remain in limbo. They found a 
place for themselves by laying stress on the importance of accumulating merit. 
Recall what, according to authors like Nāgārjuna, one had to do in order to 
become a Universal Monarch. The answer is: acquire merit. One verse spells 
out what kind of merit is meant: “Through proper honoring of stūpas, honor-
able beings, Superiors, and the elderly, you will become a Universal Monarch, 
your glorious hands and feet marked with [a design of] wheels.” In other 
words, accumulating merit is the most secure way to acquire a kingdom, or 
whatever else one wishes to acquire in a future life. The Jātakas show that accu-
mulating merit is also essential for reaching the highest aim there is, that of 
becoming a Buddha. Innumerable inscriptions confirm that the advice to accu-
mulate merit was taken to heart by rulers and subjects, by monastics and lay 
people alike.
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If we now return to the Jātakas, it will be clear that these stories could 
become examples of ideal behavior for all those who wished to increase their 
stock of merit, including those who had not decided to become Buddhas 
themselves. These stories often emphasize the generous or compassionate 
aspect of this or that earlier incarnation of the Buddha. But they do more. They 
show that one can be a totally committed Buddhist, even a future Buddha, 
while yet continuing to occupy a role in society. Living in the world is compat-
ible with being a Buddhist in the strictest sense of the term. But living in the 
world also means living in accordance with the norms of society. Depending on 
the position one occupies, one may even be obliged to kill. In this way, the 
question that must have occupied many Buddhists: “Can one be a Buddhist 
and live in society?” found its most poignant expression in the question “Can 
one be a Bodhisattva and kill?” This last question is discussed in a number of 
texts belonging to the movement that was particularly interested in the careers 
of Bodhisattvas, and which came to be known as the Bodhisattva‐yāna or 
Mahā‐yāna.50 Not surprisingly, this issue raises a number of questions, for 
example about the state of mind of the Bodhisattva and that of his victim while 
the former kills the latter.51
Related to the question of killing is that of whether war is ever justified. The 
Mahāyāna Mahāparinir vān ̣a Sūtra  states in so many words that lay Buddhists 
must protect Buddhist teaching, if necessary with the help of arms. It further 
states that killing certain people—those who reject Mahāyāna and adhere to 
particularly unwholesome views and practices—is less bad than killing animals; 
what is more, it constitutes no infringement of the prohibition to kill.52 
Enemies of Buddhism, the Sar vadurgatipariśodhana Tantra  adds, should be 
killed where possible.53 The Bodhisattvabhūmi points out that a Bodhisattva 
who is king commits a serious transgression if he does not threaten severe 
punishment in order to impose virtuous behavior on his subjects, even against 
their will.54
Once Buddhism had resolved the issue of how one could be a layman in 
society and yet be counted as a devout Buddhist, its competition with 
Brahmanism took a different shape. Brahmanism had always had the great 
advantage of being able to counsel political rulers in a most practical fashion. It 
had been able to assure those rulers that the violence they sometimes had to 
commit was in keeping with their position in society and was indeed part of 
their duty. Now that the Buddhists had come to realize that the Buddha him-
self had been king in earlier existences,55 and had competently ruled the king-
doms he had been in charge of, they could no longer blame present rulers for 
carrying out their task using the means required. This opened up new possibilities. 











They might henceforth aspire to the position of royal counselor in political 
matters, just as the Brahmins had done so far.56
A beautiful example of a Buddhist minister who justifies the kingship of 
his ruler in Buddhist terms comes from the kingdom of An ̇kor, in present‐
day Cambodia.57 The ruler concerned is Jayavarman V, who ruled from 968 
to 1001 CE. From his realm a considerable number of inscriptions have 
been preserved, one of which, the so‐called Vat‐Sithor inscription, merits 
our attention. The Buddhist minister called Kīrtipan ̣d ̣ita figures promi-
nently in this inscription, which contains some Buddhist propaganda. For 
our present purposes it is most interesting that both the king and his min-
ister Kīrtipan ̣d ̣ita are characterized as Bodhisattvas whose deeds are guided 
by the unique concern to lead their subjects to heaven and liberation. What 
the king expects from his subjects, moreover, is in agreement with the true 
teaching (dharma , saddharma ) of the Buddha, and conducts his subjects to 
better rebirths and liberation. Rulers could thus compare themselves to 
Bodhisattvas, or even to a Buddha. When the Pāla ruler Devapāla gained 
the throne, he repeatedly stated that he did so just as a Bodhisattva obtains 
the position of a Buddha, following the par inir vān ̣a  of the previous teacher 
of the world.58
Once it had become possible for Buddhists to act as counselors of the king, 
they could profit from the experience and expertise that the Brahmins had 
acquired in the course of time. More particularly, they might use the manuals 
that had been composed by Brahmins, among them the Ar thaśāstra  and the 
Laws of Manu. Evidence illustrating this comes from Sri Lanka. The rulers of 
this island and their Buddhist counselors used these Brahmanical texts for 
 running the country.59
There is no need to search for further examples. Whether or not the Buddhists 
succeeded in becoming political counselors at the royal courts, they could now 
legitimately aspire to such positions. They could do so because they had come 
to accept society as a legitimate place to live in, not just as something to flee 
from. This new development reduced the gap between Buddhists and Brahmins 
to a considerable extent. However, the Brahmins had one more trump card. 
They did not just offer political counseling. They also offered the magical pro-
tection, which only they, as possessors of traditional Vedic lore, could provide. 
It seems a fair bet that many rulers appreciated this magical protection as much 
as they did the political counseling, if not more so. In the realm of magical 
protection, traditional Buddhism had not much to offer. Neither the ascetic 
practices laid down in the ancient texts nor the rationalized doctrines, which 
Buddhists defended in their Sanskrit debates, provided magical protection in 
any form whatsoever. Certain Buddhists may have come to experience this as a 
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drawback, one that might deprive them of the political support that they yet 
desperately needed.
It is no doubt in this context that we have to understand the ever‐stronger 
tendency in Buddhism to use rites and spells. This tendency was not confined 
to Buddhism, to be sure, nor was it limited to rites and spells that might be of 
use to the royal court.60 It would not be correct either to say that there was 
once a time when Buddhism was completely without them. Protective spells 
are a common feature of Mahāyāna, and they appear to have been in use already 
in earlier phases of Buddhism.61 Philosophically inclined Buddhists held various 
views about the nature and value of mantras.62 Yet it seems clear that there was 
an upsurge of rites and spells from the seventh century CE onward.63 It is cus-
tomary to speak in this connection of Tantric Buddhism. The available  evidence 
suggests that Tantric Buddhism borrowed extensively from non‐Buddhist 
 religious currents, most notably Śaivism.64
In a recent article, Alexis Sanderson enumerates a number of factors that 
contributed to the success of the relevant form of Śaivism. One of these is “that 
the Śaivism of the Mantramārga developed in practice a thorough accommoda-
tion of the brahmanical religion that it claimed to transcend, thus minimizing, 
even eliminating, the offence it gave as a tradition whose scriptures, like those 
of the Buddhists, were seen to be, and claimed to be, outside the corpus of the 
Vedas. These Śaivas were to accept that the brahmanical tradition alone was 
valid in the domain it claimed for itself and that they were bound to follow its 
prescriptions and incorporate its rituals beside their own wherever practica-
ble.”65 This process sometimes worked in the opposite direction, as Sanderson 
points out in another article: in order to respond to the altered expectations of 
their royal clients, Brahmins of the Athar vaveda  added “Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava 
rituals to their repertoire, composing or appropriating texts that prescribe them 
and adding these to the corpus of their sacred literature.”66 Evidence for this is 
provided by certain ancillary tracts included in the Athar vavedapariśiṣṭa .
Another factor, the most vital according to Sanderson, “is that the religion 
succeeded in forging close links with the institution of kingship and thereby 
with the principal source of patronage.”67 It did so in various ways. For 
instance, Śaiva officiants occupied the office of Royal Preceptor (rājaguru) 
and in this position gave Śaiva initiation (dīkṣā) to the monarch followed by a 
specially modified version of the Śaiva consecration ritual (abhiṣeka) as an 
empowerment to rule beyond that conferred by the conventional Brahmanical 
royal consecration (rājyābhiṣeka). They provided a repertoire of protective, 
therapeutic, and aggressive rites for the benefit of the monarch and his king-
dom. They developed Śaiva rituals and their applications to enable a special-
ized class of Śaiva officiants to encroach on the territory of the Rājapurohita, 











the Brahmanical expert in the rites of the Atharvaveda who served as the 
personal priest of the king,68 warding off all manner of ills from him through 
apotropaic rites, using sorcery to attack his enemies, fulfilling the manifold 
duties of regular and occasional worship on his behalf, and performing the 
funerary and other postmortuary rites when he or other members of the royal 
family died.69
The Śaivas were not, however, the only ones to attempt to forge links with 
royalty in this manner. Buddhists tried to imitate them in this respect, too. 
Sanderson gives some examples:
We see similar cases of regularization of rites of royal protection in our evidence for the 
Buddhist Way of Mantras. The Rgya gar chos ‘byun, the Tibetan history of Indian Buddhism 
completed by Tāranātha in AD 1608, reports that in order to protect his dynasty, expand its 
rule, and spread the Buddhist religion the Pāla king Dharmapāla (r. c. 775–812) had a 
fire‐sacrifice performed regularly for many years by Tantric officiants under the direction of 
his Guru Buddhajñānapāda at an overall cost of 902,000 tolas of silver.
An inscription of the reign of Jayavarman V (r. c. 968 – c. 1000/1) reveals a similar 
arrangement in the Khmer court of Angkor. It tells us that one Kīrtipan ̣ḍita, a 
Mahāyānist scholar and adept of the Buddhist Yogatantras, who had been adopted by 
the royal family as their Guru, was frequently engaged by the king to perform 
 apotropaic, restorative and aggressive Mantra rituals within the royal palace for the 
protection of his kingdom.70
We met the Kīrtipaṇḍita here mentioned earlier: this Buddhist minister was 
apparently appreciated at the Khmer court for his ability to perform even violent 
and aggressive Mantra rituals.71 There is not much direct evidence from South 
and Southeast Asia to show that the new emphasis on incantations and rites had 
as one of its aims to secure a place for Buddhists at the royal court, apart from 
the cases just considered. It is worth mentioning here the description of a war 
machine in an Indian Buddhist Tantric text, the Kālacakra Tantra .72 This 
description, unexpected in a Tantric text, may find a partial explanation in the 
fact that this text foresees a final and definitive battle between Buddhism and 
Islam in which the latter will be destroyed. It also shows the proximity that was 
felt to exist between Buddhism and the political powers that were to make use of 
this war machine.
Brahmanical literature is full of stories about ascetics with powers far exceed-
ing those of any king. Tantric Buddhism, too, came to have its powerful ascet-
ics, often called siddhas (“accomplished ones”). This topic cannot be explored 
here, but one story from Abhayadatta’s Caturaśītisiddhapravr ̣tti may be 
 presented by way of illustration:
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In the city of Kansati, Virūpa bought wine from a tavern girl; she gave him a glass of 
wine and a plate of rice, which he greatly enjoyed. He continued eating and drinking. 
For the space of two days and a night, he prevented the sun from moving and the 
king, amazed, exclaimed: “Who is it who performs such a miracle?” In answer, the 
goddess of the sun appeared to the king in a dream and said, “A yogin has pledged 
me as payment to a tavern girl.” The king and his subjects paid the price of the wine, 
which came to a million glasses, and Virūpa disappeared.73
Geoffrey Samuel, who cites this story, comments: “What is … notable about 
this story is the implicit comparison of Virūpa’s Tantric power and the king’s 
temporal power.”74 Indeed—as is the case in many Brahmanical stories—it is 
clear that the king’s power cannot compare with that of the ascetic. In other 
words, Tantric Buddhism, like Brahmanism before it, claimed great powers, 
which the king would be wise to respect and honor.
If the evidence from South Asia concerning the political role that Buddhist 
rites and spells were meant to play is limited, it is known that Buddhism owed 
much of its attraction in China, Japan, and elsewhere to its supposed capacity 
to defend the state against danger. It may be true, as Ronald Davidson points 
out, that “Indian esoteric Buddhism did not arise for the express purpose of 
converting the courts and appealing to the intelligentsia of Tibet, China, Japan, 
Burma, or elsewhere,” but it is equally true that “its success was … dramatic in 
these areas”.75 The Tantric master Amoghavajra, to take an example, helped to 
defeat the invasion of China in 742 CE by a combined force of Tibetans, Arabs, 
Sogdians, and others. He did this through certain rituals derived from a 
Buddhist text specifically concerned with the protection of the state.76 Buddhist 
monks in China were exempted from military service, but were expected to 
execute Tantric Buddhist rites that would provide protection against natural 
and other disasters, most in particular against war and enemies.77 In Japan, in 
940 CE, the state was threatened by a rebellion. The Shingon priest Kanjo was 
directed by the Emperor to bring an image of Fūdō, a Tantric deity, to Narita 
in order to defeat the rebellion. After three weeks of continual fire offerings, 
the leader of the rebellion, Taira no Masakado, was killed by the Emperor’s 
forces and peace was restored. At least some of the credit was given to the Fūdō 
rituals.78 Geoffrey Samuel presents an interesting argument to show that one of 
the reasons why Tibet adopted Buddhism in the eighth century was identical 
with or similar to that which attracted the Chinese and the Japanese, that is, to 
secure the state and the position of the king.79 Also, later, rituals were used in 
Tibet to secure the subjugation or annihilation of enemies.80 It follows from 
these and other examples that there are plenty of reasons to think that the 
Tantric turn of Buddhism opened up a niche that had so far been inaccessible 











to this religion, and which the Buddhists had been accustomed to leave to the 
Brahmins.
There is another feature of Tantric Buddhism that might be taken as evidence 
for the political role that its rites and spells were meant to play. Tantric Buddhist 
ritual, as Ronald Davidson points out, is full of political metaphors. This impe-
rial metaphor, as Davidson calls it, finds expression in the explicit relationship 
between the initiatory ritual of the abhiṣeka  and the coronation ritual of king-
ship.81 The maṇḍalas that serve as objects of meditation, moreover, “are implic-
itly and explicitly articulations of a political horizon in which the central Buddha 
acts as the Rājādhirāja [Supreme Overlord, JB] in relationship to the other 
 figures of the maṇḍala.” Moreover, “Buddhists derived their maṇḍala forms and 
functions … from their immediate observation at the disposition and execution 
of realpolitik in their environment.” These and other examples show that eso-
teric Buddhism internalized the political models of medieval India. Davidson 
suggests that, in this way, “the great litterateurs and teachers of North Indian 
monasteries [were] trying to sanctify the world as they received and accepted 
it.” The mission of Buddhist cloisters, he adds, “was a consensual effort at sanc-
tifying society.”82 This, if true, is of course of the greatest interest in our present 
context. Buddhism had always abstained from justifying society in any of its 
forms, not to speak of sanctifying it. Davidson’s analysis suggests that the 
Buddhist attitude to society had changed most radically.
Does this mean that Buddhism had now succeeded in freeing itself from the 
weight of Brahmanism? For many centuries, though not right from the begin-
ning, subcontinental Buddhism had conceded to a form of cohabitation with 
Brahmanism in which the latter was responsible for matters of state, society, 
and much else. It took Buddhists many centuries to emancipate themselves 
from this tutelage. Had they finally succeeded now that they could admit that 
Buddhists, too, could play roles in society, including the role of ruler or coun-
selor to the ruler? And that they could compete with Brahmins even in the 
domain of rites and incantations? To some extent, the answer is no doubt yes. 
Buddhists could now develop ideas about the way the state should be run, and 
they could now offer the kind of supernatural protection that had always been 
provided by Brahmins.83 However, the Buddhists remained indebted to 
Brahmanism in various ways. This can be seen as follows.
The Buddhists of South Asia had not developed any realistic ideas about 
statecraft of their own. They had slowly come to accept many of the Brahmanical 
ideas. They themselves never produced more than modified versions of these 
Brahmanical ideas. The Buddhist concept of the ruler as a Bodhisattva was new, 
to be sure, as was the accompanying view that rulers acted for the soteriological 
well‐being of their subjects. In practical terms, however, I know of no evidence 
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that might show that Buddhists in South and Southeast Asia really struck out 
on their own. The Brahmanical model was and remained the basis of their 
political thought.
In the realm of supernatural protection by means of rites and spells, one 
might expect a greater distance from the Brahmanical tradition. Buddhists 
underwent in this area the influence of Śaivism, which was itself in competition 
with traditional Brahmanism. In spite of this, Tantric Buddhism contains many 
features that were directly taken from the orthodox Brahmanical tradition. 
Shrikant Bahulkar has shown, in a private communication, that Vedic concepts, 
practices, and even a Ṛgvedic mantra found a place in this form of Buddhism. 
Its texts do not even hesitate to mention the Brahmanical division of society 
into four classes (varn ̣a), whose existence they clearly take for granted. As an 
example of this last feature we may consider three parallel Buddhists texts deal-
ing with a rite called the Ahorātravrata. All three of these texts contain detailed 
stipulations as to the ways Brahmins, Ks ̣atriyas, Vaiśyas, Śūdras, and those 
belonging to lower castes should perform their worship. The lowest castes are 
discouraged from worshipping at all, or at the very least they are told to stay far 
away from the object of veneration.84
South Asian Buddhists, then, have had little opportunity to reassert them-
selves against the Brahmins who had been their rivals for so long. Their ulti-
mately unsuccessful attempts at doing so took them far from the ideas and 
practices they had adhered to during the early centuries of their religion, and 
dangerously close to their much‐detested rivals. Most notably, their competi-
tion with the Brahmins offered no opportunity to develop ideas about political 
peace. Quite on the contrary, where Indian Buddhism had originally looked 
with disapproval upon all forms of violence, including political violence, in the 
course of time they found ways to justify and contribute to it.
Conclusion
What does all this mean? In one sentence, it means that Indian antiquity has 
produced no credible ideas about political peace. This may look surprising in a 
civilization in which mental peace played such an important role. Mental peace 
is central in Buddhism and in many manifestations of Brahmanism. To be sure, 
there may be an element of rhetoric in this claimed interest in mental peace, 
but it seems undeniable that it represented a real concern to at least some 
Brahmins and Buddhists. Typically, the standard way to attain this mental peace 
was by leaving human society altogether. Human society, even in periods of 
political peace, was often rejected as not conducive to mental peace. This does 











not change the fact that many of those in search of mental peace would have 
benefited from a society in which there was political peace: they usually 
depended upon the gifts provided by members of society. However, thinkers 
did little to promote political peace. Those Brahmins whose influence was felt 
at the court were too occupied with promoting their own interests, and many 
of the others (primarily the Buddhists), having first left this responsibility to 
those Brahmins, ended up trying to imitate them. In this way they entered into 
competition with the Brahmins even in the realms that they had initially ceded 
to them. The result was that war was endemic in India for all but the few peri-
ods in which one kingdom succeeded in uniting a major part of the subconti-
nent under a single ruler. Thinking about political peace did not play a credible 
role in ancient India and never exerted a noticeable influence.
The Christian priest Charles Freer Andrews, a friend and admirer of Mahatma 
Gandhi, wrote to the latter in 1918, praising Indians who “as a race did repudi-
ate bloodlust.” Gandhi did not agree with his friend, and it will be interesting 
to cite his words:
Is this historically true? I see no sign of it either in the Mahabharata or the Ramayana, not 
even in my favourite Tulsidas… The incarnations [of God] are described as certainly blood-
thirsty, revengeful and merciless to the enemy. They have been credited with having resorted 
to tricks also for the sake of overcoming the enemy. The battles are described with no less 
zest than now, and the warriors are equipped with weapons of destruction such as could be 
possibly conceived by the human imagination. The finest hymn composed by Tulsidas in 
praise of Rama gives the first place to his ability to strike down the enemy… The code of 
Manu prescribes no such renunciation that you impute to the race. Buddhism, conceived as 
a doctrine of universal forbearance, signally failed, and, if the legends are true, the great 
Shankaracharya did not hesitate to use unspeakable cruelty in banishing Buddhism out of 
India… Even among the Jains the doctrine has signally failed. They have a superstitious 
horror of blood(shed), but they have as little regard for the life of the enemy as a European.85
Gandhi had no illusions about the nonviolent nature of his own “race.” Perhaps 
characteristically, it was a foreigner who attributed to India the tendency to 
nonviolent politics, and the modern apostle of nonviolence par excellence, 
Gandhi, who knew better.
Notes
1 Especially at the beginning of this chapter, there is some overlap with Richard 
Salomon’s “Ancient India: Peace within and War without” (2007).
2 Thapar 1963: 255–56.
3 Ibid. 256.
4 Bakker 2006: 29.
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 5 I believe that Cristina Scherrer‐Schaub (2007: 762 n. 14) must be right in think-
ing that the memory of the “epigraphical” Aśoka survived him for many centuries. 
The fact that both Rudradāman (ca. 150 CE) and Samudragupta (two centuries 
later) left inscriptions in places where there were already inscriptions of Aśoka 
(Falk 2006: 118–19, 158–59) may be understood as supporting this belief. 
Far from being “curieux” and “peu digne d’un grand souverain” (Fussman 2007: 
707), is it not possible that these rulers thus augmented their glory through asso-
ciation with the great former emperor? The “literary” Aśoka exerted an influence 
on more recent rulers, most notably Kaniṣka; see Deeg 2012.
 6 Scharfe 1989: 51.
 7 See Trautmann 1971: 10–68 for an analysis of the story of Cāṅakya and 
Candragupta in the various sources. Further McClish & Olivelle 2012: xi ff.
 8 For the most recent enumeration of arguments against this identification, see 
Olivelle 2013: 31–38.
 9 Note that the Ar thaśāstra  (2.10 and elsewhere) is familiar with writing and scribes 
(lekhaka).
10 Fussman 1987–1988: 46.
11 The surviving Ar thaśāstra is, as a matter of fact, a composite text, dating from 
“the first or perhaps the second century A.D.” (Scharfe 1993: 293), “100 BCE–100 
CE” (McClish & Olivelle 2012: xx–xxi). See further Trautmann 1971: 174ff.; 
Bronkhorst 1991; 2011: §2.3.
12 McClish & Olivelle 2012: 156.
13 Ibid. xlvii.
14 Ibid. 123.
15 Trans. Olivelle 2005.
16 Trans. Olivelle 1997; 2006.
17 See Fussman 1980: 387: “L’Inde ancienne ne connaît pas de distinction entre 
guerre juste et guerre injuste, entre guerre d’agression et guerre défensive. La 
guerre n’a pas à être justifiée. Elle est le devoir du kṣatriya—et sa raison d’être.”
18 They are accessible in the many (42) volumes of the Epigraphia Indica  and other 
such collections.
19 Gommans 1999: 305.
20 In his contacts with contemporary kings, the Buddha abstained from giving them 
political advice, if the early sources are to be trusted: Bareau 1993: 38.
21 Meisig 1988: 142ff.
22 Trans. ibid. 413.
23 For the parallel in Chinese translation, see Warder 1980: 165–66.
24 Walshe 1987: 397–98.
25 Hartmann 1987: 36–37.
26 Thapar 2002: 221.
27 Hahn 1999: 38–39.
28 Mātṛcet ̣a was the intellectual “grandchild” of Nāgārjuna according to Bu ston and 
Tārānātha, but the value of this testimony is dubious (Hartmann 1987: 36). 
Another Buddhist author belonging roughly to the same time is Āryadeva, who 











wrote critically about kings in the fourth chapter of his Catuḥśataka ; see Lang 
1986: 46–47; 1992.
29 Hopkins 1998: 118.
30 Ibid. 148.
31 Jamspal et al. 1978: 14.
32 Ibid. 65.
33 Johnston (1936: II. xiv) provides a piece of evidence, which he does not press, 
suggesting that Mātṛceṭa is somewhat later in date than Aśvaghos ̣a.
34 Buddhac 9.40–41, 43.
35 Abhidh-k-bh(P)  4.36, p. 221 l. 13–15; Abhidh-k(VP)  vol. 4 p. 91.
36 For the sometimes violent forms that this competition took, see Verardi 2011.
37 See the historical surveys by Pingree (1981) and Plofker (2007, 2009); further 
Bronkhorst 2007.
38 Lingat 1989: 152–53; Bronkhorst 2010.
39 The Jainas, here as elsewhere, adjusted more easily, as may be clear from the fol-
lowing (Flügel 2007: 3–4): “Jaina texts on kingship, statecraft and personal law 
were composed in contexts where individual Jain mendicants exercised personal 
influence over one or other ‘Hindu’ king or local official. The majority of the texts 
were created by monks of the Digambara tradition which had a sustained influence 
on the ruling dynasties in the Deccan between the eighth and twelfth centuries. 
The most significant Jaina works on statecraft are the Ādipurāṇa  of Ācārya Jinasena 
(ca. 770–850 CE) and the N ītivākyāmr ̣tam (ca. 950 CE) and the Yaśastilaka  (959 
CE) of Ācārya Somadeva Sūri. Both authors were associated with the rulers of the 
Rāṣṭrakūṭa empire. The Ādipurāṇa  belongs to the genre of universal history. It tells 
the life story of the first Jina, the legendary first king and law‐giver r ̣ṣabha, in the 
manner of a Jaina Mahābhārata , and for the first time offers blueprints for Jain 
social rituals and Jain kingship through the Jainization of Brāhmaṇical prototypes. 
The N ītivākyāmr ̣tam, by contrast, is an entirely secular text on statecraft modelled 
on the Ar thaśāstra  of Kauṭilya … with barely noticeable emphasis on Jaina moral-
ity.” This last text “barely shows any Jain traits at all.” (Dundas 1991: 176).
40 La Vallée Poussin 1925; 1927: 47–48.
41 Wangchuk 2007.
42 Jātakas also inspired people who did not wish to become Buddhas themselves, 
perhaps already at a time when the Bodhisattva ideal did not yet exist; see Walters 
1997: 166.
43 Bodhisattvas characterize primarily Mahāyāna (on which below), but not exclu-
sively so; see Samuels 1997; Appleton 2010: 91–108.
44 Nattier 2003: 223, 225, 226.
45 Ibid. 246.
46 Shih 1994: 35.
47 It goes without saying that a Bodhisattva keeps his wealth in order to benefit oth-
ers: “A bodhisattva is not covetous of his body, life, or wealth. If he protects his 
body, life, and wealth, it is to regulate sentient beings” (ibid. 54).
48 Ibid. 57.
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49 Ibid.
50 It may be useful to recall Skilling’s (2005: 270–71) observation that Śrāvakayāna 
and Mahāyāna are “[t]wo of the most overworked categories in Buddhist studies:” 
“we have reified the categories and treated Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna as discrete 
historical agents and movements, when they are meant to describe related processes 
of intellectual interaction, often intense dialogue and debate, within a single (but 
infinitely variable) imagination, Buddhism. The categories are meant to provide a 
background, to help us sort out our data, but they have marched on to the stage 
and taken over the show.”
51 See Schmithausen 2007; also 1996: 76–77; 1999: 59; further Kleine 2003: 246–47.
52 Schmithausen 1996: 75; 1999: 57–58. The Mahāyāna Aṇgulimālīya Sūtra  
expresses itself similarly: Schmithausen 2003.
53 Schmithausen 1996: 76; 1999: 58; Skorupski 1983: 66, 218.
54 Schmithausen 2003: 42–43.
55 Many hundreds of times the Buddha had been a universal ruler (rājā cakkavattī), 
already according to the Aṅguttara Nikāya  (AN  IV p. 89).
56 Note that “the Rājadharma-nyāya-śāstra , part of the massive Yogācārabhūmiśāstra  
ascribed to Maitreya and Asaṅga (early centuries CE), puts kingship into the larger 
scheme of a Bodhisattva’s development as accepted by the Yogācāra school; it 
strongly emphasizes morality, though the urge for world conquest is not quite 
reconciled with non‐violence” (Scharfe 1989: 22, with a reference to Jan 1984).
57 Mertens 2000.
58 Davidson 2002: 89.
59 Lingat 1989: 152; Bechert 1966: 24.
60 Some certainly were. Gray (2007: 252) gives an example from the Cakrasam ̣vara 
Tantra  of “a fierce homa  rite for the purpose of subduing a rival kingdom.”
61 See Snellgrove 1987: 121–22; Bongard‐Levin et al. 1996: 30–31; Skilling 
1997: 63–64; 2007; Davidson 2002: 144–45. The gāndhār ī vidyā (Pāli gandhār ī 
nāma vijjā) “spell (?) from Gandhāra” (Tucci [1963: 147–48] proposes: “a 
magical formula connected with or placed under the control of Gāndhārī [the 
Devī from Gandhāra]”) is already referred to in the Kevaddha  Sutta  of the 
D īgha  N ikāya  (DN  I p. 213). Early dhāran ̣īs are found in the texts from Gilgit; 
see Hinüber 1981.
62 Braarvig 1997; Eltschinger 2001, 2008.
63 Davidson 2002: 116–17.
64 Sanderson 1988: 678–79; 1994; but see White 2005: 8–9.
65 Sanderson 2005: 231–32; see also Sanderson 2007b: 231–32.
66 Sanderson 2007a: 196.
67 Sanderson 2005: 232; see also Gupta and Gombrich 1986; Sanderson 2007b: 
241–42, 288–89.
68 On the precise qualifications of Purohitas and their historical development, see 
Inden 1992.
69 Sanderson 2005: 233, 238–39.
70 Ibid. 238.











71 Kīrtipan ̣ḍita was mentioned above at n. 57. On the expression of violence in 
Buddhist Tantric mantras, see Verhagen 1999.
72 Grönbold 1996.
73 Samuel 1993: 431, citing from Robinson 1979: 29.
74 Samuel, ibid.
75 Davidson 2005: 23–24.
76 Samuel 2002: 10, with a reference to Chandra 1992. For the activities of Tantric 
Buddhists at and around the imperial court, see Strickmann 1996: 213–14.
77 Demiéville 1957: 355; see also Shen 2004.
78 Samuel 2002: 11.
79 Samuel 2002.
80 Schmithausen 1996: 80–81. On the not altogether idyllic nature of traditional 
Tibetan society, see Parenti 2007; Trimondi and Trimondi 1999: 478–79. Western 
notions of Tibet are exposed in Lopez 1998.
81 Davidson 2002: 123–24.
82 Quotes: ibid. 131, 139, 160, 161.
83 One would think that they might even occupy themselves with astrology and 
related sciences. It is in this connection interesting to note that Amoghavajra, the 
Tantric Buddhist master in China whom we met before (at n. 76 above), is also 
reported to have been the author of a text on Indian astrology (Yano 1987).
84 Handurukande 2000: xvii, 22–23, 75–76, 88, 107–8, 120, 125.
85 Letter of July 6, 1918: Gandhi 1965: 474–75.
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Pingree, D. 1981. Jyotiḥśāstra: Astral and Mathematical Literature. Wiesbaden.
Plofker, K. 2007. “Mathematics in India.” In V. Katz (ed.), The Mathematics of Egypt, 
Mesopotamia, China, India, and Islam: A Sourcebook, 385–514. Princeton.
Plofker, K. 2009. Mathematics in India . Princeton.
Renondeau, G., and Demiéville, P. 1957. H istoire des moines guerriers du Japon, by 
G. Renondeau; Le bouddhisme et la  guerre, by Paul Demiéville. Paris.
Robinson, J. B. (trans.). 1979. Buddha’s Lions: The Lives of the Eighty-Four Siddhas. 
Caturaśīti-siddha-pravr ̣tti by Abhayadatta . Berkeley.
Salomon, R. 2007. “Ancient India: peace within and war without.” In K. A. Raaflaub 
(ed.), War and Peace in the Ancient World, 53–65. Malden and Oxford.
Samuel, G. 1993. Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan Society. Washington DC.
Samuel, G. 2002. “Buddhism and the state in eighth‐century Tibet.” In H. Blazer 
(ed.), Religion and Secular Culture in Tibet 1–19. Leiden.











Samuels, J. 1997. “The Bodhisattva ideal in Theravāda Buddhist theory and practice: a 
reevaluation of the bodhisattva‐śrāvaka opposition.” Philosophy East and West 47.3: 
399–415.
Sanderson, A. 1988. “Śaivism and the tantric traditions.” In S. Sutherland, L. Houlden, 
P. Clarke, and F. Hardy (eds.), The World’s Religions, 660–704. London.
Sanderson, A.1994. “Vajrayāna: origin and function.” In Buddhism into the Year 2000, 
87–102. Bangkok and Los Angeles.
Sanderson, A. 2005. “Religion and the state: Śaiva officiants in the territory of the 
king’s brahmanical chaplain.” Indo-Iranian Journal 47 (2004): 229–300.
Sanderson, A. 2007a. “Atharvavedins in tantric territory. The Āṅgirasakalpa texts of the 
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akaraṇa.” In A. Griffiths and A. Schmiedchen (eds.), The Athar vaveda and its 
Paippalādaśākhā: H istorical and Philological Papers on a Vedic Tradition, 195–311. 
Aachen.
Sanderson, A. 2007b. “The Śaiva exegesis of Kashmir.” In D. Goodall and A. Padoux 
(eds.), Mélanges tantriques à  la  mémoire d’H élène Brunner /  Tantric Studies in 
Memor y of H élène Brunner , 231–442. Pondichéry, Paris.
Scharfe, H. 1989. The State in Indian Tradition. Leiden.
Scharfe, H. 1993. Investigations in Kaut ̣alya’s Manual of Political Science. 2nd rev. ed. 
of Untersuchungen zur Staatsrechtslehre des Kaut ̣alya . Wiesbaden.
Scherrer‐Schaub, C. 2007. “Immortality extolled with reason: philosophy and politics 
in Nāgārjuna.” In B. Kellner, H. Krasser, H. Lasic, et al. (eds.), Pramān ̣akīr tiḥ: 
Papers Dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner , part 2: 757–93. Vienna.
Schmithausen, L. 1996. “Buddhismus und Glaubenskriege.” In P. Hermann (ed.), 
Glaubenskriege in Vergangenheit und Gegenwar t, 63–92. Göttingen.
Schmithausen, L. 1999. “Aspects of the Buddhist attitude towards war.” In Houben 
and van Kooij 1999: 45–67.
Schmithausen, L. 2003. “Einige besondere Aspekte der ‘Bodhisattva‐Ethik’ in Indien 
und ihre Hintergründe.” Hōrin 10: 21–46.
Schmithausen, L. 2007. “Zur Frage, ob ein Bodhisattva unter bestimmten 
Voraussetzungen in einer neutralen Geisteshaltung (avyākr ̣ta-citta) töten darf.” In 
K. Klaus and J.‐U. Hartmann (eds.), Indica et Tibetica. Festschrift für Michael H ahn, 
423–40. Vienna.
Shen, W. 2004. “Magic power, sorcery and evil spirit: the image of Tibetan monks in 
Chinese literature during the Yuan dynasty.” In C. Cüppers (ed.), The Relationship 
Between Religion and State (chos srid zung ‘brel) in Traditional Tibet, 189–227. 
Lumbini.
Shih, H.‐C. 1994. The Sutra on Upāsaka Precepts. Translated from the Chinese of 
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